There are two ways of handling bilateral multi-issue negotiations -one is to negotiate all the issues together, and the other is to negotiate them one by one. The order in which issues are negotiated in issue-by-issue negotiation is specified by the agenda, which can be defined in two ways. One way is to decide it exogenously, i.e., before negotiation begins. The other way is to let the players decide which issue they will negotiate next, during the process of negotiation, i.e., the agenda is determined endogenously. Against this background, this paper studies the effect of combining the exogenous and endogenous agendas on the players' utilities. More specifically, we determine whether, decomposing a set of AE issues into stages (for ½ AE), determining the issues to be negotiated at each stage exogenously, and negotiating each stage sequentially using an endogenous agenda can improve an agent's utility relative to the utility it gets if the agenda for all the AE issues is defined endogenously. For each agent, we find the expected utility for each value of between 1 and AE. The value of that gives an agent maximum utility is its optimal number of stages.
INTRODUCTION
In many bargaining situations the parties involved negotiate more than one issue. A concrete example of such multi-issue bargaining is the purchase of a good/service where the agents have to agree, among other things, on the price, the quality of service and financing. There are two approaches to multi-issue negotiation [8] . One is to bundle all the issues and discuss them simultaneously. This complete package approach allows the players to exploit trade-offs among different issues, but requires complex computations to be performed [10] . The other approach, which is computationally simpler, is to negotiate the issues one by one [3] . A second and perhaps more important reason why parties may choose to settle issues one by one is the strategic implications of the choice of the negotiation procedure (i.e., issue-by-issue vs complete package). When there are two issues to negotiate, the decision to negotiate them simultaneously, or one by one, is by no means neutral to the outcome [17] . Although issue-by-issue negotiation minimizes the complexity of the negotiation procedure, an important question that arises is the order in which the issues are bargained. This ordering is called the negotiation agenda [8] .
It has been shown in [8] that the agenda is one of the factors that determines the outcome of negotiation. For instance, if there are two issues, and , the two agendas and can lead to two different outcomes. The agents need not have identical preferences over these outcomes, and one of them may prefer the agenda to , while the other may prefer to . This is because the bargainers may have time constraints for reaching agreements on the issues. Each player may have its own deadline for reaching agreement on these issues. Moreover, the endpoint may not be the only way in which time influences negotiation behaviour [14, 15, 16, 7] . Consider the case in which the service is provided immediately after the successful negotiation on an issue ends (say at price È and time Ì). In some situations, it is not sufficient merely for an agent to ensure that Ì is earlier than its deadline. This may be the case, for instance, because one of the agents, say the buyer, could be losing utility with time as a result of not getting the service. On the other hand, the seller may perhaps gain more utility by providing the service as late as possible. Thus, in this case, the seller tries to maximize Ì (within the limit of its deadline) and the buyer tries to minimize Ì. In short, agents can have different attitudes towards time. Generally speaking, the most common time effects in bargaining situatons are time discounting and deadlines [12, 11] . An agent that gains utility with time and has the incentive to reach a late agreement (within its deadline) is said to be a patient player.
An agent that loses utility with time and tries to reach an early agreement is said to be an impatient player. As we will show, this disposition and the actual deadline itself strongly influence strategic behaviour and, consequently, the negotiation outcome. Given this fact, exploring the role of the bargaining agenda, and how players might manipulate it, becomes an interesting and important area of research, especially given that many real life negotiations involve multiple issues.
In this paper we focus on procedures that allow parties to negotiate the issues successively rather than as one bundle. Issue-by-issue negotiation has been explored in [5, 6, 8, 9] . In these models the negotiation agenda is defined either exogenously or endogenously. If the agenda is defined before negotiation begins, then it is said to be exogenous. On the other hand, if the agents are allowed to decide which issue they will negotiate next, during the process of negotiation, then the agenda is said to be endogenous. The difference between the existing work on issue-by-issue negotiation and ours is existing models study the strategic behaviour of agents by defining the agenda for all the issues either exogenously or endogenously. In contrast, we study the strategic behaviour of agents by defining an agenda that is partly exogenous and partly endogenous, and compare the outcome with the one that is generated if the agenda for all the issues is defined endogenously.
Our present work builds on the framework of [5, 6] which uses an endogenous agenda for all the issues. The players in this model use negotiation decision functions to generate offers and counter-offers [4] . The strategic behaviour of agents, which have time constraints and incomplete information, is studied for AE negotiation issues.
Here, we study the effect of decomposing the set of AE issues into (for ½ AE) subgroups and negotiating them sequentially, in stages, on the time of equilibrium agreement. The issues to be settled at each stage are determined exogenously. The negotition protocol and equilibrium strategies of [5, 6] are then applied to each individual stage, and each agent's utility is determined for each value of . The value of that gives an agent the maximum utility is the optimal number of stages for that agent. The key result of our study is as follows. In some negotiation scenarios, thestage negotiation improves the utility of both agents, relative to the utility they get using the single stage negotiation protocol described in [5, 6] . However, identifying these scenarios requires each agent to know some private information about its opponent. Making an agent's private information known to the opponent can change the strategic behaviour of the opponent and result in decreased utility to the agent. It is therefore not feasible for agents to exchange their private information. We therefore extend the single stage negotiation protocol of [5, 6] by introducing a mediator. The mediator, that is assumed to be a neutral agent, obtains the required information from the two participants, and allows the players to improve their utilities by identifying such scenarios. We show that the extended -stage negotiation protocol always gives each agent a utility that is no worse than the corresponding utility from single stage negotiation.
This paper makes two key advances to the state of the art in multi-issue negotiation. Firstly, it analyzes the strategic behaviour of agents by using an agenda that is partly exogenous and partly endogenous. Contrast this with the existing work that uses either an exogenous agenda or an endogenous agenda for all the AE issues.
Secondly, it presents an extended -stage negotiation protocol that allows the players to improve their utilities, compared to the utilities from the single stage negotiation protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the issue-by-issue bargaining model of [5, 6] . In Section 3 we describe our -stage negotiation model. Section 4 describes the extended -stage negotiation protocol. Section 5 discusses related work. Finally, in Section 6 we give some conclusions and make suggestions for future work.
THE SINGLE STAGE NEGOTIATION MODEL
We give a brief description of the multi-issue bargaining model of [5, 6] , for which we determine the optimal agenda. A buyer, , and a seller, ×, that have unequal deadlines, bargain over the price of two 1 distinct issues, and . Let denote one of the two agents, i.e., ¾ × , and its opponent. Let Ì denote agent 's deadline for reaching agreement on both the issues. Agents have unequal deadlines and negotiation on all the issues must end by the earlier of the two deadlines. Otherwise, the agent with the earlier deadline quits and negotiation ends in a conflict; a situation which both agents prefer to avoid. We first describe the agents' information states, and then give an overview of the negotiation protocol and state the equilibrium outcomes.
Agents' Information State
We first consider the agents' information for a single issue, and then generalise it for more than one issue. For each issue, each agent has a reservation limit, a deadline, and a utility function. When there is more than one issue to be negotiated (i.e., AE ½), ÊÈ in Á represents a set of reservation prices for the AE issues. The elements Ä Ô and Ä Ø now represents a set of AE lotteries instead of a single lottery. The buyer and seller utilities are defined with the following two functions, Í and Í × , that incorporate the effect of time discounting. Here, Ô is the price for issue , Ø is the time ½ This is a general model for negotiating AE issues but for the sake of simplifying the discussion we consider only two issues.
of agreement for issue , and AE is agent 's discounting factor for issue . The utility functions can also be written in the following form.
Note that AE ½ in the first form corresponds to ¼ in the second, and AE ½ corresponds to ¼. Each agent's information state is its private knowledge that is not known to the opponent.
Negotiation Protocol
This is basically an alternating offers protocol. There are two types of offers. An offer on just one issue is referred to as a single offer and an offer on two issues is referred to as a combined offer. One of the agents starts by making a combined offer. The other agent can accept/reject part of the offer (single issue) or the complete offer. If it rejects the complete offer, then it sends a combined counter-offer. This process of making combined offers continues until agreement is reached on one of the issues. Thereafter, agents only make offers on the remaining issue. Negotiation ends when agreement is reached on both the issues or a deadline is reached. Let Ø × denote the offer made on issue by to × at time Ø. The action,
offer, is defined as:
The action for is defined analogously. A counter-offer for an issue is generated using the negotiation decision functions described in [13, 4] . Although agents initially make offers on both issues, there is no restriction on the price they offer. Thus by initially offering a price that lies outside the zone of agreement, i.e., the interval ÊÈ × Ê È , an agent can effectively delay the time of agreement for that issue. For example, can offer a very low price which will not be acceptable to ×, and × can offer a high price which will not be acceptable to . In this way, the order in which the issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium, rather than imposed exogenously before negotiation begins. See [5, 6] for details on the equilibrium strategies of agents.
Equilibrium Outcomes
Here, Ì denotes 's deadline for reaching agreement on all the issues, and Ì × denotes ×'s deadline for all the issues. For the above negotiation protocol, the strategic behaviour of each agent is studied on the basis of its own information state. In this model, the equilibrium outcome always results in an agreement on all the AE issues. The equilibrium outcome on an issue depends on two factors: the relationship between the agent deadlines, and the agents' time preferences on that issue. Since the agents' utilities depend on the price, as well as time of agreement, the equilibrium outcome specifies both values. The equilibrium price for all the AE issues depends on the relationship between agent deadlines, while the equilibrium time of agreement on an issue depends on the agents' time preferences for that particular issue and their deadlines. More specifically, in the equilibrium outcome, the price-surplus on all the issues goes to the agent with the longer deadline. The time of agreement on an issue depends on the agents' time preferences for that issue and the deadlines. When at least one agent prefers a late agreement on an issue (i.e., AE ½ or ¼ for at least one agent), then agreement on issue takes place at the earlier deadline (denoted Ì). Otherwise the issue is agreed near the beginning of negotiation (denoted Ì ¼ ). Thus in some negotiation scenarios agreement on an issue occurs at the earlier deadline, while in others it occurs towards the beginning of negotiation.
THE Ã-STAGE NEGOTIATION MODEL
In the previous section, the order in which the AE issues were bargained over, and agreements reached, is determined endogenously as part of the negotiation equilibrium. Also, the equilibrium time of agreement on each issue is either Ì (the earlier deadline) or Ì ¼ here is therefore to study the effect of decomposing the AE issues into stages and negotiating each stage sequentially (by applying the protocol and equilibrium strategies of Section 2 to each stage), on the time of equilibrium agreement, and how this in turn affects the agents' utilities. In other words, we determine if the cumulative utility from all the AE issues can be improved for both the agents as a result of decomposition. We first give the formal definition of a -stage decomposition and then determine the optimal agendas for both the agents.
Preliminary Definitions
We decompose the set of AE issues into equal subsets, and negotiate the subsets sequentially in stages. The issues to be negotiated at each stage are defined exogenously (i.e., before negotiation begins). The issues that comprise each stage are negotiated by applying the protocol and equilibrium strategies of [5, 6] . In other words, the issues to be negotiated at each stage are determined exogenously, while the order in which the issues are settled at each stage is defined endogenously as part of the equilibrium outcomes of Section 2.3. For each stage, (½ ), we define a deadline Ì for each agent. These deadlines are defined in such a way that the following two constraints are satisfied.
C1. For each agent, , negotiation must end on all the stages by Ì . In other words, Ì Ì for both and ×, where Ì denotes agent 's deadline for reaching agreement on all the AE issues, and Ì Ì for all values of less than .
C2. The relationship between agent deadlines for each of the stages (i.e., the relationship between Ì and Ì for ½ ) has the same relationship as that between Ì and Ì . In other words, the relation between agent deadlines is identical for all the stages and is independent of the value of , i.e., decomposition preserves the relation between agent deadlines.
Note that in Section 2, ½. We begin by formally defining a decomposition of a set of negotiation issues and a negotiation agenda. We then determine the optimal agenda for each agent. We find the optimal agenda for each agent as follows. For each -stage agenda, we find the expected utility (from all the AE issues) to each agent. The value of that gives an agent the maximum expected utility forms its optimal agenda.
Recall that in the previous section (for ½ ), the equilibrium price depends on the relationship between agent deadlines, while the equilibrium time of agreement depends on the agents' time preferences and the agent deadlines. Also, each agent has a single deadline, Ì , for completing negotiation on all the AE issues.
Since decomposition preserves the relation between agent deadlines (see constraint ¾), and we use the endogenous agenda of [5, 6] for each stage, the equilibrium price for each of the AE issues for a -stage decomposition (where ½) remains identical to the equilibrium price given in Section 2 for ½ . But since the AE issues now have different deadlines (as opposed to Section 2 where each agent had a single deadline, Ì , for negotiating all the AE issues), the equilibrium time of agreement for the AE issues changes.
In other words, the utility from price remains the same for both the agents, while their utility from time changes as a result of decomposition. 
Optimal Agendas
The optimal agenda for both the agents is determined in the following steps. 5. Determine the negotiation scenarios in which the optimal number of stages is identical for the two agents, i.e., Ó Ó .
If the optimal number of stages is identical for two the agents (and is not 1, as in the previous section), then it means that both the agents can benefit by negotiating the AE issues in sequential stages.
Each of these steps is explained in detail below.
Step 1. For each value of (½ AE Step 2. In order to determine the agent's utilities, we first determine the time of agreement for each issue. As stated earlier, the time of agreement on issue depends on the agents' time preferences for that issue and the agents' deadlines. There are three possible scenarios in which negotiation can take place on an issue . Figure 2 shows Ì for different values of , that lie in the range 1 and AE, for AE ¼ . As seen in the figure, the average equilibrium time of agreement, on issue , is minimum at ½ , and increases as increases. It reaches a maximum of Ì ¾ , when the number of stages is equal to the number of issues.
Thus the average equilibrium time of agreement on an issue, for different values of , can be obtained from Figure 1 (for scenarios Ë½ and Ë¿) and Figure 2 (for scenario Ë¾). For instance, the average equilibrium time of agreement on an issue, for , is ¼ Ì in scenarios Ë½ and Ë¿, and ¼ Ì in scenario Ë¾. For AE, the average equilibrium time of agreement on an issue is Ì ¾ , in all three scenarios.
Step 3. Having obtained the average equilibrium time of agreement on an issue for all values of between 1 and AE, we determine the optimal number of stages for each agent. This is done as follows. For each value of we compute the cumulative expected utility from all the AE issues ( Í ), to each agent. The value of for which Í is maximum is the optimal number of stages for agent , and is denoted Ó . Note that although an agent's utility on an issue depends on both the price and time of agreement for that issue, we only need to determine the effect of decomposition on the utility from time. This is because (as stated earlier), the equilibrium price does not change as a result of decomposition; only the time of agreement does.
Let denote the number of issues on which agent prefers a late agreement. This corresponds either to scenario S1 or S3. Let denote the number of issues on which agent prefers an early agreement but the opponent prefers a late agreement, i.e., (AE , we obtain Ì½ and Ì¾ from Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. For each value of , we then study the effect of and on Í .
Consider first the effect of on the cumulative utility. When is large (i.e., the agent prefers a late agreement on most of the issues), the first term in Equation 3 contributes a larger share to Í than the remaining two terms. The first term has a maximum value at ½ , since on each of the issues, this results in agreement at the latest possible time (i.e., Ì). For all values of greater than a particular value, say , Í was found to be maximum at ½ . In our experiments was found to be 15. On the other hand, when (i.e., the agent prefers a late agreement on a small number of issues), the relationship between Í ½ and Í Cumulative EU for agent a Z for agent a "k=1" "k=2" "k=20" "k=50" Step 4. On the basis of values for and , we define the following four negotiation scenarios.
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Each agent negotiates in one of the above four scenarios, which may be different for the two agents.
Step 5. On the basis of the value of Ó obtained in step 3, we determine the scenarios in which Ó Ó , i.e., the agents have identical values for the optimal number of stages. The different scenarios in which the two agents can interact, and the associated values of Ó are summarized in Table 1 .
The following theorems give some results about the negotiation scenarios in which the agents have identical and conflicting values for the optimal number of stages. To sum up, in some negotiation scenarios, both agents can improve their respective utilities by using the AE-stage decomposition.
THE EXTENDED Ã-STAGE NEGOTIA-TION PROTOCOL
In the previous section, we showed that in some negotiation scenarios the AE-stage negotiation yields maximum utility to both the agents. In order to identify such scenarios (listed in Theorem 2) the agents need to know the relationship between ( and ), ( and ), ( and ), and ( and ). However, recall that this information is not present in an agent's information state (see Section 2.1 for details on an agent's information state). Each agent plays the equilibrium strategy that is determined on the basis of its own information state. In order to allow the agents to get the maximum possible utility, we extend the negotiation protocol described in Section 2.2 by introducing a new agent called the mediator.
The role of the mediator is to facilitate the process of reaching an optimal agreement between the players by finding the optimal agenda. In order to determine the optimal agenda, the mediator first obtains each agents' time preference on each of the AE issues.
For each agent , the mediator finds and sends it to agent . Each agent then computes Ó and passes it on to the mediator. The mediator then determines the optimal agenda and sends it to both the agents. The agents then negotiate each stage as described in Section 2. ¼. So neither nor × know the opponent's actual time preferences over the AE issues, and the agents' strategic behaviour remains the same as in Section 2. Secondly, for thestage negotiation, the set of issues to be settled at each stage need to be selected randomly from the set of AE issues. If either or × is allowed to do this selection, it can select the issues for each stage on the basis of its time preferences (i.e., it could select the issues on which it prefers an early agreement for the earlier stages and the issues on which it prefers a late agreement for the later stages). We avoid this by having the mediator select the issues randomly for each stage.
The extended -stage negotiation protocol is explained in more detail below. 
RELATED WORK
Issue-by-issue negotiation has been explored in [8, 1, 9, 6, 5] . Fershtman [8] extends Rubinstein's complete information model [14] for splitting a single pie to multiple pies. This model imposes an agenda exogenously, and studies the relation between the agenda and the outcome of the bargaining game. It is based on the assumption that both players have identical discounting factors and does not consider agent deadlines. Similar work in a complete information setting includes [9] but it makes the agenda endogenous. Bac and Raff [1] developed a model that has an endogenous agenda. They extended Rubinstein's model [15] for single pie bargaining with incomplete information by adding a second pie. In this model the price-surplus is known to both agents. For both agents, the discounting factor is assumed to be equal over all the issues. One of the players knows its own discounting factor and that of its opponent. The other player knows its own discounting factor but is uncertain of the opponent's discounting factor. This can take one of two values, AEÀ with probability ¥ and AEÄ with probability ½ ¥. These probabilities are again common knowledge. Thus agents have asymmetric information about discounting factors.
While [8, 1, 2, 9] study the process of issue-by-issue negotiation in the absence of deadlines, the multi-issue model presented in [5, 6] analyses the effect of deadlines and discounting factors on issue-by-issue negotiation. However, the outcome generated by [5, 6] , which uses an endogenous agenda for all the AE issues, is not always Pareto optimal. We therefore determine if the utility to both agents can be improved by combining the exogenous agenda with the endogenous agenda. This is done by decomposing the AE issues into equal stages. The issues for each stage are determined exogenously, while the order in which issues are settled at each stage is determined endogenously. We then find the optimal agenda for each agent. Thus while existing work defines the agenda either exogenously for all the AE issues, or endogenously for all the AE issues, in our work the definition of the agenda is partly exogenous and partly endogenous.
Our study shows that in some scenarios, the utility to both agents can be improved by using the -stage negotiation compared to the single stage negotiation. Moreover, our study also shows that the players do not have the ability to identify such scenarios, since they do not have complete information about all the negotiation parameters. We therefore presented a -stage negotiation protocol, that allows agents to identify such scenarios, and thereby result in improved utility to both the agents.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the effect on the negotiation outcome of decomposing a set of AE negotiation issues into stages, and negotiating each stage sequentially. The set of issues to be negotiated at each stage is determined exogenously, while the order in which the issues are negotiated at each stage is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium. Our study shows that the negotiation outcome changes with the value of . Our study also shows that the optimal number of decompositions for an agent depends on the negotiation parameters. In some negotiation scenarios the optimal number of decompositions for the two agents differs, while in others it is identical. In other words, there exist negotiation scenarios in which the utility to both the agents can be improved by negotiating in stages compared to the utilities they get from single stage negotiation. However, since agents have incomplete knowledge of the negotiation parameters, they do not have the ability to identify these scenarios. We therefore presented an extended -stage negotiation protocol, that allows agents to identify these scenarios through a mediator.
The proposed -stage negotiation model thus offers two key advantages for agent mediated negotiation. Firstly, it is computationally simpler since it is basicaly an issue-by-issue model, and as such does not involve making tradeoffs between issues. Secondly, it results in improved utility to both the agents compared to the single stage model. This paper studied the strategic behavior of agents by defining an agenda that was partly exognous and partly endogenous. In future, it would be interesting to explore the agents' strategic behaviour by separating the negotiation over the agenda from the negotiation over the issues.
